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THE POWER OF KINGS:

And in Particular, OF THE King of ENGLAND.

Learnedly Asserted,
By Sir ROBERT FILMER, Kt.

WITH
A PREFACE of a Friend:
Giving an Account
Of the AUTHOR and his WORKS.

In Magnis voluisse sat est------

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KINGS

OF

ROME

THE PREFACE.

Whoso would go about to speak Sir Robert Filmer's *worth, hath no more to do but onely to Number and to Name his Writings, as they were written in the following Order.*

Questio Quodlibetica, *or* a Discourse of Usury, *written about* 1630. *and first published in the year* 1656.

Patriarcha, *or the* Natural Right of Kings maintained, against the Unnatural Right of the People to Govern, or chuse themselves Governours. *Written about the year* 1642. *and never Published till of late.*

Of the Blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. *Published in the year* 1656.

The Anarchy of a Limited and Mixed Monarchy, *or* Observations upon Mr. *Hunton*'s Treatise on that Subject. *First Published in the year* 1646.

The Free-holders grand Inquest, touching our Soveraign Lord the King, and his Parliament. *In the year* 1648.

Of the Power of Kings: and in particular, of the King of *England*. *First Published in the same year.*

Observations upon Mr. *Hobbes*'s *Leviathan*, Mr. *Milton* against *Salmasius*, and *H. Grotius* De Jure Belli & Pacis, *concerning* the Original of Government. *To which* those upon Mr. *Huntons Book being re-printed, were annexed in the year* 1652.

Observations upon *Aristotle*'s Politicks, touching Forms of Government. *Published in the same year.*

And the Advertisement to the Jury-men of *England* touching Witches, with the difference between an *English* and an *Hebrew* Witch. *In the year* 1653.

Whoso would give his Writings their due, hath done it already, in saying that they are His. Of which, who reads any one, may have some cause to wonder how he came to be sufficiently furnished to write that; but who proceeds yet farther to read them all, will have more abundant cause to wonder, should any else but He have wrote the rest.

His Political Writings are chiefly levell'd against a Doctrine but too generally embrac'd of late That, all men are born equal. *To disprove which, though it might be sufficient to appeal to the Practice and Experience of Mankinde, whether all Nations have not still with one Consent mounted their Kings upon* Thrones; *and whether all the Masters of Philosophies and Religions have not constantly appeared in their* Chairs, *and in their* Pulpits, *while their Disciples have humbly presented themselves at their* Feet? *Not to speak of all the several Heights of Authority, or extents of Command, which either Popular Oratory have attained to by their Wit, or Conquerours have raised themselves to by their Arms. Our Author himself is an undeniable proof of his own Assertion, and has given us the best evidence that all men are not equal by Birth, while he himself hath no equal in Writing. So impossible is it for him to treat either of the means of Acquiring, or the Rights of exercising Soveraignty, without acquiring and exercising a new Soveraignty over his Readers. For does he overcome others? even we at the same time are made Captives without resistance, and are his by right of Conquest. Or does he govern in their stead? even then all Readers are insensibly under his Command, as much as if they were his Subjects, and are his by right of natural Soveraignty. A Reason so far exalted above ours as his, makes him appear like those Kings of old, who were in Stature much superiour to their Subjects, and seemed so far to overtop the rest, as if Nature it self had marked them out for Heads of all. To be short, no Power, whose Cause our Author pleads, can be so absolute, as what he obtains over us at the same time himself. And yet of so sweet a Tyranny, who that are under it can complain? Arguments so prevailing, who is able to withstand? And where the Mastery is gained over us by no other force than that of Perswasion, who would forego the pleasure of Obedience? The Empire which Wit and Eloquence have over men, seems to be like that Command which Musick hath over the Wilde Beasts, that civilizes and subdues them at one and the same time. And we, while we read this Author, feel the highest of rational Pleasures, even then when we are made at once both Better Subjects, and Wiser Men.*

THE

The Power of Kings:

And in Particular,

Of the KING of ENGLAND.

TO *Majeſtie* or *Soveraignty* belongeth an *Abſolute Power* not ſubject to any Law. It behoveth him that is a Soveraign, not to be in any ſort Subject to the Command of Another; whoſe Office is to give Laws unto his Subjects, to Abrogate Laws unprofitable, and in their *ſtead* to Eſtabliſh other; which he cannot do, that is himſelf Subject to Laws, or to Others which have Command over him: And this is that which the Law ſaith, that *The Prince is acquitted from the Power of the Laws.*

The Laws, Ordinances, Letters-Patents, Priviledges, and Grants of Princes, have no force but during their Life; if they be not ratified by the expreſs Conſent, or at leaſt by Sufferance of the Prince following, who had knowledge thereof.

If the Soveraign Prince be exempted from the Laws of his Predeceſſors, much leſs ſhall he be bound unto the Laws he maketh Himſelf; for a man may well receive a Law from Another man, but impoſſible it is in Nature for to give a Law unto Himſelf, no more than it is to Command a mans ſelf in a matter depending of his Own Will: *There can be no Obligation which taketh State from the meer Will of him that promiſeth the ſame*; which is a neceſſary Reaſon to prove evidently, that a King cannot binde his Own Hands, albeit that he would: We ſee alſo in the end of all Laws theſe words, *Becauſe it hath ſo Pleaſed us*; to give us to underſtand, that the Laws of a Sovereign Prince, although they be grounded upon Reaſon, yet depend upon nothing but his meer and frank good Will. But as for the Laws of God,

all Princes and People are unto them ſubject; neither is it in their power to impugne them, if they will not be guilty of High Treaſon againſt God; under the greatneſs of whom, all *Monarchs* of the world ought to bow their Heads, in all fear and reverence.

A Queſtion may be, *Whether a Prince be ſubject to the Laws of his Countrey that he hath ſworn to keep, or not?* If a Soveraign Prince promiſe by Oath to his Subjects to keep the Laws, he is bound to keep them; not for that a Prince is bound to keep his Laws by himſelf or by his Predeceſſors, but by the juſt Conventions and Promiſes which he hath made himſelf; be it by Oath, or without any Oath at all, as ſhould a private man be: and for the ſame cauſes that a Private man may be relieved from his unjuſt and unreaſonable Promiſe, as for that it was ſo grievous, or for that he was by deceit or fraud Circumvented, or induced thereunto by Errour, or Force, or juſt Fear, or by ſome great Hurt; even for the ſame cauſes the Prince may be reſtored in that which toucheth the diminiſhing of his Majeſty: And ſo our *Maxime* reſteth, *That the Prince is not ſubject to His Laws, nor to the Laws of his Predeceſſors, but well to his Own juſt and reaſonable Conventions.*

The Soveraign Prince may derogate from the Laws that he hath promiſed and ſworn to keep, if the Equity thereof ceaſe, and that of himſelf, without Conſent of his Subjects; which his Subjects cannot do among Themſelves, if they be not by the Prince relieved.

The Forraign Princes well-adviſed, will never take Oath to keep the Laws of their Predeceſſors; for otherwiſe they are not Sovereigns.

Notwithſtanding all Oaths, the Prince may Derogate from the Laws, or Fruſtrate or Diſanul the ſame, the Reaſon and Equity of them ceaſing.

There is not any Bond for the Soveraign Prince to keep the Laws, more than ſo far as Right and Juſtice requireth.

Neither is it to be found, that the Antient Kings of the *Hebrews* took any Oaths, no not they which were Anointed by *Samuel*, *Elias*, and others.

As for General and Particular, which concern the Right of

of men in Private, they have not uſed to be otherwiſe Changed, but after General Aſſemblies of the Three Eſtates in *France*; not for that it is neceſſary for the Kings to reſt on their Advice, or that he may not do the Contrary to that they demand, if natural Reaſon and Juſtice do ſo require. And in that the Greatneſs and Majeſty of a true Soveraign Prince is to be known, when the Eſtates of all the People aſſembled together in all Humility preſent their Requeſts and Supplications to their Prince, without having any Power in any thing to Command, or Determine, or to give Voice; but that that which it pleaſeth the King to Like or Diſlike, to Command or Forbid, is holden for Law. Wherein they which have written of the Duty of Magiſtrates, have deceived themſelves, in maintaining that the Power of the People is greater than the Prince; a thing which oft-times cauſeth the true Subjects to revolt from the Obedience which they owe unto their Soveraign Prince, aud miniſtreth matter of great Troubles in Commonwealths; of which their Opinion, there is neither reaſon nor ground.

If the King ſhould be Subject unto the Aſſemblies and Decrees of the People, he ſhould neither be King nor Soveraign, and the Commonwealth neither Realm nor Monarchy; but a meer *Ariſtocracy* of many Lords in Power equal, where the Greater part commandeth the leſs; and whereon the Laws are not to be publiſhed in the Name of him that Ruleth, but in the Name and Authority of the Eſtates; as in an *Ariſtocratical* Seignory, where he that is Chief hath no Power, but oweth Obeiſance to the Seignory; unto whom yet they every one of them feign themſelves to owe their Faith and Obedience: which are all things ſo abſurd, as hard it is to ſee which is furtheſt from Reaſon.

When *Charles* the eighth, the *French* King, then but Fourteen years old, held a Parliament at *Tours*, although the Power of the Parliament was never Before nor After ſo great, as in thoſe Times; yet *Relli* then the Speaker for the People, turning himſelf to the King, thus beginneth: *Moſt High, moſt Mighty, and moſt Chriſtian King, our Natural and Only Lord; we poor, humble, and obedient Subjects, &c. which are come hither by your Command, in all Humility, Reverence, and*

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Subjection, preſent our ſelves before you, &c. *And have given me in charge from all this Noble Aſſembly to declare unto You, the good Will and hearty deſire they have, with a moſt fervent Reſolution to Serve, Obey, and Aid You in all your Affairs, Commandments, and Pleaſures.* All this Speech is nothing elſe but a Declaration of their good Will towards the King, and of their humble Obedience and Loyalty.

The like Speech was uſed in the Parliament at *Orleans* to *Charles* the 9th, when he was ſcarce Eleven Years old.

Neither are the Parliaments in *Spain* otherwiſe holden, but that even a greater Obedience of all the People is given to the King; as is to be ſeen in the Acts of the Parliament at *Toledo* by King *Philip*, 1552. when he yet was ſcarce Twenty Five Years old. The Anſwers alſo of the King of *Spain* unto the Requeſts and humble Supplications of his People, are given in theſe words: *We will*, or elſe, *We Decree or Ordain*; yea, the Subſidies that the Subjects pay unto the King of *Spain*, they call *Service*.

In the Parliaments of *England*, which have commonly been holden every Third Year, the Eſtates ſeem to have a great Liberty, (as the Northern People almoſt all breathe thereafter) yet ſo it is, that in effect they proceed not, but by way of Supplications and Requeſts to the King. As in the Parliament holden in *Octob.* 1566. when the Eſtates by a common Conſent had reſolved (as they gave the Queen to underſtand) not to Treat of any thing, until She had firſt Appointed who ſhould Succeed Her in the Crown; She gave them no other Anſwer, but *That they were not to make her Grave before ſhe were Dead.* All whoſe Reſolutions were to no purpoſe without Her good liking, neither did She in that any thing that they requeſted.

Albeit by the Sufferance of the King of *England*, Controverſies between the King and his People are ſometimes determined by the High Court of Parliament; yet all the Eſtates remain in full ſubjection to the King, who is no way bound to follow their Advice, neither to conſent to their Requeſts.

The Eſtates of *England* are never otherwiſe Aſſembled, no more than they are in *France* or *Spain*, than by Parliament-Writs

Writs and expreſs Commandments, proceeding from the King; which ſheweth very well, that the Eſtates have no Power of themſelves to Determine, Command, or Decree any thing; ſeeing they cannot ſo much as Aſſemble themſelves, neither being Aſſembled, Depart without expreſs Commandment from the King.

Yet this may ſeem one ſpecial thing, that the Laws made by the King of *England*, at the Requeſt of the Eſtates, cannot be again repealed, but by calling a Parliament; though we ſee *Henry* the eighth to have always uſed his Soveraign Power, and with his only word to have diſannulled the Decrees of Parliament.

We conclude the Majeſty of a Prince to be nothing altered or diminiſhed by the Calling together, or Preſence of the Eſtates: But to the contrary, His Majeſty thereby to be much the Greater and the more Honourable, ſeeing all His People to acknowledge Him for their Soveraign.

We ſee the principal Point of Soveraign Majeſty and Abſolute Power to conſiſt principally in giving Laws unto the Subjects without their Conſent. It behoveth, that the Soveraign Prince ſhould have the Laws in his Power, to Change and Amend them according as Occaſion ſhall require.

In a *Monarchy*, every one in particular muſt ſwear to the Obſervation of the Laws, and their Allegiance to One Soveraign *Monarch*; who, next unto God, (of whom he holds his Scepter and Power) is bound to No Man: For an Oath carrieth always with it Reverence unto whom, and in whoſe Name it is made, as ſtill given to a Superiour; and therefore the Vaſſal gives ſuch Oath unto his Lord, but receives None from Him again, though they be mutually Bound, the One of them to the Other.

Trajan ſwore to keep the Laws, although he under the name of a Soveraign Prince was exempted; but never any of the Emperours before him ſo ſware: Therefore *Pliny* the Younger, in a *Panegyrical Oration*, ſpeaking of the Oath of *Trajan*, gives out, *A great Novelty*, ſaith he, *and never before heard of, He ſweareth, by whom we ſwear.*

Of theſe two things the one muſt come to paſs, to wit, the Prince that ſwears to keep the Laws of his Country, muſt

either not have the Soveraignty, or elſe become a Perjur'd Man, if he ſhould but Abrogate but one Law contrary to his Oath; whereas it is not only Profitable that a Prince ſhould ſometimes Abrogate ſome ſuch Laws, but alſo Neceſſary for him to Alter or Correct them, as the infinite Variety of Places, Times and Perſons ſhall require: Or if we ſhall ſay, the Prince to be ſtill a Soveraign, and yet nevertheleſs with ſuch conditions, that he can make no Law without the Advice of his Councel or People; He muſt alſo be Diſpenſed with by his Subjects, for the Oath which he hath made for the Obſervation of the Laws; and the Subjects again which are obliged to the Laws, have alſo need to be Diſpenſed withal by their Prince, for fear they ſhould be Perjur'd: So ſhall it come to paſs, that the Majeſty of the Commonweal enclining now to this ſide, now to that ſide; ſometimes the Prince, ſometimes the People bearing ſway, ſhall have no Certainty to reſt upon; which are notable Abſurdities, and altogether incompatible with the Majeſty of Abſolute Soveraignty, and contrary both to Law and Reaſon. And yet we ſee many men, that think they ſee more in the matter than others, will maintain it to be moſt Neceſſary, that Princes ſhould be bound by Oath, to keep the Laws and Cuſtoms of their Countreys: In which doing, they weaken and overthrow all the Rights of Soveraign Majeſty, which ought to be moſt Sacred and Holy, and confound the Soveraignty of One Soveraign *Monarch*, with an *Ariſtocracy* or *Democracy*.

Publication, or Approbation of Laws, in the Aſſembly of the Eſtates or Parliament, is with us of great importance for the keeping of the Laws; not that the Prince cannot of himſelf make a Law, without the Conſent of the Eſtates or People (for even all his Declarations of War, Treaties of Peace, Valuations of the Coin, Charters to enable Towns to ſend Burgeſſes to Parliament, and his Writ of Summons to both Houſes to Aſſemble, are Laws, though made without the Conſent of the Eſtates or People;) but it is a Courteous part to do it by the good liking of the Senate.

What if a Prince by Law forbid to Kill or Steal, is he not Bound to obey his own Laws? I ſay, that this Law is not

His,

His, but the Law of God, whereunto all Princes are more ſtraitly bound than their Subjects; God taketh a ſtricter account of Princes than others, as *Solomon* a King hath ſaid; whereto agreeth *Marcus Aurelius*, ſaying, *The Magiſtrates are Judges over private men, Princes judge the Magiſtrates, and God the Princes.*

It is not only a Law of Nature, but alſo oftentimes repeated among the Laws of God, that we ſhould be Obedient unto the Laws of ſuch Princes; as it hath pleaſed God to ſet to Rule and Reign over us; if their Laws be not directly Repugnant unto the Laws of God, whereunto all Princes are as well bound as their Subjects: For as the Vaſſal oweth his Oath of Fidelity unto his Lord, towards and againſt all men, except his Soveraign Prince: So the Subject oweth his Obedience to his Soveraign Prince, towards and againſt all, the Majeſty of God excepted, who is the Abſolute Soveraign of All the Princes in the World.

To confound the ſtate of *Monarchy*, with the *Popular* or *Ariſtocratical* eſtate, is a thing impoſſible, and in effect incompatible, and ſuch as cannot be imagined: For Soveraignty being of it ſelf Indiviſible, How can it at one and the ſame time be Divided betwixt One Prince, the Nobility, and the People in common? The firſt Mark of Sovereign Majeſty is, to be of Power to give Laws, and to Command over them unto the Subjects: And who ſhould thoſe Subjects be that ſhould yield their Obedience to the Law, if they ſhould have alſo Power to make the Laws? Who ſhould He be that could Give the Law, being he himſelf conſtrain'd to Receive it of them, unto whom he himſelf Gave it? So that of neceſſity we muſt conclude, that as no One in particular hath the Power to make the Law in ſuch a State, that there the State muſt needs be Popular.

Never any Commonwealth hath been made of an *Ariſtocracy* and Popular Eſtate, much leſs of all the Three Eſtates of a Commonwealth.

Such States, wherein the Right of Soveraignty is Divided are not rightly to be called Commonweals, but rather the Corruption of Commonweals; as *Herodotus* hath moſt briefly but truely written.

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Commonweals which change their State, the Soveraign Right and Power of them being Divided, finde no reſt from Civil Wars.

If the Prince be an Abſolute Soveraign, as are the true *Monarchs* of *France*, of *Spain*, of *England*, *Scotland*, *Turkey*, *Moſcovy*, *Tartary*, *Perſia*, *Æthiopia*, *India*, and almoſt of all the Kingdoms of *Africk* and *Aſia*; where the Kings themſelves have the Soveraignty, without all doubt or queſtion, not Divided with their Subjects: In this caſe it is not lawful for any One of the Subjects in particular, or all of them in general, to attempt any thing, either by way of Fact or of Juſtice, againſt the Honour, Life, or Dignity of the Soveraign, albeit he had committed all the Wickedneſs, Impiety, and Cruelty that could be ſpoke. For as to proceed againſt Him by way of Juſtice, the Subject hath not ſuch Juriſdiction over his Soveraign Prince, of whom dependeth all Power to Command, and who may not only Revoke all the Power of his Magiſtrates, but even in whoſe Preſence the Power of all Magiſtrates, Corporations, Eſtates and Communities ceaſe.

Now if it be not lawful for the Subject by the way of Juſtice to proceed againſt a King, How ſhould it then be lawful to proceed againſt him by way of Fact or Force? For queſtion is not here what men are able to do by Strength and Force, but what they ought of Right to do; as not whether the Subject have Power and Strength, but whether they have lawful Power to Condemn their Soveraign Prince.

The Subject is not only guilty of Treaſon in the higheſt Degree, who hath Slain his Soveraign Prince, but even he alſo which hath Attempted the ſame, who hath given Counſel or Conſent thereto; yea, if he have Concealed the ſame, or but ſo much as Thought it: Which Fact the Laws have in ſuch Deteſtation, as that when a man guilty of any Offence or Crime, dyeth before he be condemned thereof, he is deemed to have died in whole and perfect Eſtate, except he have conſpired againſt the Life and Dignity of his Soveraign Prince. This only thing they have thought to be ſuch, as that for which he may worthily ſeem to have been

now

now already Judged and Condemned; yea, even before he was thereof Accuſed. And albeit the Laws inflict no Puniſhment upon the Evil Thoughts of men, but on thoſe only which by Word or Deed break out into ſome Enormity; yet if any man ſhall ſo much as conceit a Thought for the Violating of the Perſon of his Soveraign Prince, although he have Attempted nothing, they have yet Judged this ſame Thought worthy of Death, notwithſtanding what Repentance ſoever he have had thereof.

Leſt any men ſhould think [Kings or Princes] themſelves to have been the Authors of theſe Laws, ſo the more ſtraitly to provide for their own Safety and Honour; let us ſee the Laws and Examples of Holy *Scripture*.

Nabuchodonoſor King of *Aſſyria*, with Fire and Sword deſtroyed all the Country of *Paleſtina*, beſieged *Jeruſalem*, took it, rob'd and razed it down to the ground, burnt the *Temple*, and defiled the *Sanctuary of God*, ſlew the King, with the greateſt part of the people, carrying away the reſt into Captivity into *Babylon*, cauſed the Image of himſelf made in Gold to be ſet up in Publick place, commanding all men to Adore and Worſhip the ſame, upon pain of being Burnt alive, and cauſed them that refuſed ſo to do, to be caſt into a burning *Furnace*. And yet for all that, the holy Prophets [*Baruch* 1. *Jeremy* 29.] directing their Letters unto their Brethren the *Jews*, then in Captivity in *Babylon*, will them to pray unto God for the good and happy Life of *Nabuchodonoſor* and his Children, and that they might ſo long Rule and Reign over them, as the Heavens ſhould endure: Yea even God himſelf doubted not to call *Nabuchodonoſor* his Servant, ſaying, *That he would make him the moſt Mighty Prince of the world*; and yet was there never a more deteſtable Tyrant than he: who not contented to be Himſelf Worſhipped, but cauſed his Image alſo to be Adored, and that upon pain of being burnt quick.

We have another rare Example of *Saul*, who poſſeſſed with an evil Spirit, cauſed the Prieſts of the *Lord* to be without juſt Cauſe ſlain, for that one of them had received *David* flying from him; and did what in his power was to kill, or cauſe to be kill'd, the ſame *David*, a moſt innocent Prince,

by whom he had got ſo many Victories; at which time he fell twice himſelf into *David*'s Hands: who blamed of his Souldiers for that he would not ſuffer his ſo mortal Enemy, then in his power, to be Slain, being in aſſured Hope to have enjoyed the Kingdom after his Death; he deteſted their Counſel, ſaying, *God forbid that I ſhould ſuffer the Perſon of a King, the Lords Anointed, to be violated.* Yea, he himſelf defended the ſame King perſecuting of him, whereas he commanded the Souldiers of his Guard, overcome by Wine and Sleep, to be wakened.

And at ſuch time as *Saul* was ſlain, and that a Souldier, thinking to do *David* a pleaſure, preſented him with *Saul*'s Head; *David* cauſed the ſame Souldier to be Slain, which had brought him the Head, ſaying, *Go thou Wicked, How durſt thou lay thy impure Hands upon the Lords Anointed? Thou ſhalt ſurely Die therefore.*

And afterwards, without all Diſſimulation, mourned Himſelf for the dead King. All which is worth good conſideration: for *David* was by *Saul* proſecuted to Death, and yet wanted not Power to have revenged Himſelf, being become Stronger than the King; beſides, he was the Choſen of God, and Anointed by *Samuel* to be King, and had Married the King's Daughter: And yet for all that, he abhorred to take upon him the Title of a King, and much more to Attempt any thing againſt the Life or Honour of *Saul*, or to Rebel againſt him; but choſe rather to Baniſh himſelf out of the Realm, than in any ſort to ſeek the Kings Deſtruction.

We doubt not but *David*, a King and a Prophet, led by the Spirit of God, had always before his Eyes the Law of God, *Exod.* 22. 28. *Thou ſhalt not ſpeak Evil of thy Prince, nor detract the Magiſtrate*; neither is there any thing more common in Holy Scripture, than the forbidding not only to Kill or Attempt the Life or Honour of a Prince, but even for the very Magiſtrates, although, ſaith the Scripture, *They be Wicked and Naught.*

The *Proteſtant* Princes of *Germany*, before they entred into Arms againſt *Charles* the Emperour, demanded of *Martin Luther*, if it were Lawful for them ſo to do, or not; who frankly told them, That it was not Lawful, whatſoever Ty-

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ranny or Impiety were pretended; yet was he not therein by them Believed; ſo thereof enſued a Deadly and moſt Lamentable War, the End whereof was moſt Miſerable; drawing with it, the Ruine of many great and noble Houſes of *Germany*, with exceeding ſlaughter of the Subjects.

The Prince, whom you may juſtly call the Father of the Country, ought to be to every man Dearer and more Reverend than any Father, as one Ordained and Sent unto us by God. The Subject is never to be ſuffered to Attempt any thing againſt the Prince, how Naughty and Cruel ſoever he be: lawful it is, not to obey him in things contrary to the Laws of God, to Flie and Hide our ſelves from him; but yet to ſuffer Stripes, yea, and Death alſo, rather than to Attempt any thing againſt his Life and Honour. O how many Tyrants ſhould there be, if it ſhould be lawful for Subjects to kill Tyrants? How many good and innocent Princes ſhould as Tyrants periſh by the Conſpiracy of their Subjects againſt them? He that ſhould of his Subjects but exact Subſidies, ſhould be then, as the Vulgar People eſteem him, a Tyrant: He that ſhould Rule and Command contrary to the good Liking of the People, ſhould be a Tyrant: He that ſhould keep ſtrong Guards and Garriſons for the ſafety of his Perſon, ſhould be a Tyrant: He that ſhould put to death Traitors and Conſpirators againſt his State, ſhould be alſo counted a Tyrant. How ſhould good Princes be aſſured of their Lives, if under colour of Tyranny they might be Slain by their Subjects, by whom they ought to be Defended?

In a well-ordered State, the Soveraign Power muſt remain in One onely, without Communicating any part thereof unto the State, (for in that caſe it ſhould be a Popular Government, and no *Monarchy.*) Wiſe *Polititians*, *Philoſophers*, *Divines*, and *Hiſtoriographers*, have highly commended a *Monarchy* above all other Common-weals. It is not to pleaſe the Prince, that they hold this Opinion; but for the Safety and Happineſs of the Subjects. And contrarywiſe, when as they ſhall Limit and Reſtrain the Soveraign Power of a *Monarch*, to Subject him to the General Eſtates, or to the Council; the Soveraignty hath no firm Foundation, but they frame a Popular Confuſion, or a miſerable *Anarchy*, which is the Plague of

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all Eſtates and Commonweals: The which muſt be duely conſidered, not giving credit to their goodly Diſcourſes, which perſwade Subjects, that it is neceſſary to ſubject *Monarchs*, and to give their Prince a Law; for that is not only the Ruine of the *Monarch*, but alſo of the Subjects. It is yet more ſtrange, that many hold Opinion, that the Prince is ſubject to his Laws, that is to ſay, ſubject to his Will, whereon the Laws which he hath made depend; a thing impoſſible in Nature. And under this Colour, and ill-digeſted Opinion, they make a mixture and confuſion of Civil Laws, with the Laws of Nature and of God.

A pure Abſolute *Monarchy* is the ſureſt Commonweal, and without Compariſon, the Beſt of all. Wherein many are abuſed, who maintain that an *Optimacy* is the beſt kinde of Government; for that many Commanders have more Judgment, Wiſdome, and Counſel, than One alone. For there is a great difference betwixt Councel and Commandment.

The Councel of Many wiſe men may be better than of One; But to Reſolve, Determine, and to Command, One will always perform it better than Many: He which hath adviſedly digeſted All their Opinions, will ſoon Reſolve without Contention; the which Many cannot eaſily perform: It is neceſſary to have a Soveraign Prince, which may have Power to Reſolve and Determine of the Opinions of his Council.

FINIS.